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Abstract: “What is sovereignty?” If there are questions international legal and political scholars
ought to be able to answer, this is certainly one. State sovereignty is arguably the basis of all
political and legal international relations. And, yet, what it means remains elusive. As we
discuss whether we are witnessing the demise of the Westphalian system, it is critical to
understand state sovereignty today.
Despite the resurgence in sovereignty scholarship, there has been little empirical work done
that combines political and legal theory. This project addresses that gap in the current
literature between political science and international legal research by providing an empirical
study of how sovereignty is conceptualized in international legal discourse. The theoretical
basis for this paper is largely informed by international relations theory of binding states and
the variability of sovereignty. The methodological approach is legal case analysis. Because
sovereignty is such a slippery concept, the question of how to study it is tricky. This paper will
follow Jens Bartelson’s approach and avoid the direct question “what is sovereignty?” and
instead ask the question “how do we discuss sovereignty?” The project provides an analysis of
advisory opinions and contentious cases before the International Court of Justice over the last
fifteen years.
The results of the research contribute to a general understanding of contemporary sovereignty
in two main ways: Firstly, the study provides a framework of “ideal types” which suggests that
contemporary notions of sovereignty fall into three main categories: (1) as the final and
supreme power of the state requiring no justification (“The Prince”), (2) as a supreme power
justified by the state’s ability to protect its citizens from both internal and external threats
(“The Protector”), and (3) as a privilege granted by citizens of the state and the international
community in return for accepting certain norms and fulfilling certain responsibilities (“The
Citizen”). Secondly, the paper suggests that with a viable working vocabulary, legal and political
scholars can then address questions concerning how the legal discussion of sovereignty
interacts with international relations structure.
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Creating a Working Vocabulary of Sovereignty:
Language at the International Court of Justice
D. Alison von Rosenvinge*
Sovereignty is not obsolete, but it needs to be re‐examined carefully. 1

I. INTRODUCTION
The problem with sovereignty is that its meaning encompasses not only ideas that are different
but concepts that are in direct tension with each other, if not actually mutually exclusive.
Sovereignty is both the sphere of a state’s liberty without an independent normative status as
well as the description of the state endowed with certain rights by a prior normative code.2
Martti Koskenniemi has described at length “[t]he ambiguity about the modern doctrine of
sovereignty follows this paradox.”3 At one extreme is the sovereignty of Carl Schmitt, with his
emphasis on the political power to decide the exception to normative obligations and, at the
other extreme, the sovereignty of Hans Kelsen, with his emphasis on the state as deriving its
authority from complying with certain basic norms.4 As a consequence, the modern
conceptualization of sovereignty is in flux, alternating between two extremes.
Between these two extremes, we can agree that state sovereignty is about power and law.5
We use the term itself to describe both the political and legal status of a state. In the political
realm, state leaders rely on sovereignty to justify action to their own people and to the global
community. In the legal realm, international organizations use state sovereignty as a threat and
a promise to obligate state leaders to conform to rules and norms. Despite the fact that the
term is used to mean so many things that it is almost meaningless, we come back to it, because
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Thomas M. Franck, The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy
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there is something about sovereignty that has not been replaced by alternative political and
legal systems. For now, the sovereign state persists as the basis of political and legal systems.6
If we can agree that state sovereignty remains a vital part of international relations and
international law in the twenty‐first century, we should also be able to admit that we need a
working vocabulary to discuss and analyze what it is. There may have been a time when the
classic conceptualization of sovereignty in the tradition of Bodin or Hobbes—based on the ideal
that leaders of discrete territorial entities exclude all external actors from domestic government
decision making—was a satisfactory description, but in a world where both the United Sates
and Fiji are sovereign, we need a more nuanced vocabulary today.7
The recent resurgence of sovereignty scholarship reflects a shared sense that no matter how
overused and vague the term sovereignty is, it remains a critical part of international legal and
political relations. Our world is highly interdependent (as we know from crises in our capital
markets, environment, technology).8 One could be forgiven for thinking that the most
important matters span all national boundaries, and yet the sovereign state remains the basis
for all international relations. Yet, as Jens Bartelson has pointed out, “modern political science
often testifies to its own inability when it tries to come to terms with the concept and reality of
sovereignty; it is as if we cannot do to our contemporaneity what Bodin, Hobbes and Rousseau
did to theirs.”9
We have not “come to terms” with sovereignty because we haven’t tried, but because we have
not approached it as both the legal and political subject that it is. Contemporary universities
divide the study of law and politics into different departments (even entirely different schools),
leaving those subjects that span both disciplines inadequately studied. Political scientists may
be too skeptical that international law has any weight in international relations, and legal
scholars may not be skeptical enough. There must be some middle ground for studying
sovereignty from both the perspective of politics and law. Jean Bodin was both a jurist and a
political philosopher, as was Carl Schmitt, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay. In this project, I
want to begin to re‐integrate legal and political theories to study sovereignty. This paper is a
modest first step in a larger effort to provide an empirical study of how sovereignty is
conceptualized in international legal discourse and what sovereignty means in terms of
international relations theories concerning binding states and international political structure.

6

Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, State Sovereignty as Social Construct 3 (1996).

7

Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 20 (1999).

8

Thomas M. Franck, The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy
and Subsidiarity 20‐21 (Tomer Broude and Yuval Shany eds., 2008).
9

Jens Bartelson, A genealogy of sovereignty 1 (1995).
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Here I provide an analysis of advisory opinions and contentious cases before the International
Court of Justice (the “I.C.J.”) in the period since the end of the Cold War.
This research contributes to a general understanding of contemporary sovereignty in two main
ways: Firstly, the study demonstrates that sovereignty is not a static characteristic resulting
necessarily from certain power configurations, but rather is a bundle of rights and
responsibilities that vary according to both domestic and global context. Secondly, the study
provides a taxonomy of “ideal types” based on lines of I.C.J. cases that help organize our
discussion of sovereignty. The I.C.J. decisions fall into three categories (or ideal types) of
sovereignty: (1) The Prince, as the final and supreme power of the state requiring no legal or
political justification, (2) The Protector, as state power justified by the state’s ability to protect
its own citizens from both internal and external threats, and (3) The Citizen, as power granted
by citizens and the international community in return for accepting certain norms and fulfilling
certain responsibilities.

II. THE CASES
A. THE PRINCE
Sovereignty is not limited either in power, or in function, or in length of time.10
The Prince comes as close to the traditional notion of the Westphalian ideal type as any
incarnation of sovereignty. This ideal type assumes all power resides in the state because the
state exists. In this version of sovereignty, the state does not need to justify, explain or validate
its actions or non‐actions. There is no higher authority than the state in the international
realm. Sovereignty is the power of the state to accept or reject legal obligations.
Jean Bodin and Carl Schmitt best articulate this ideal type of sovereignty. For Schmitt,
sovereignty is unlimited, undivided and foremost, a political concept.11 Political power controls
legal power. In other words, the sovereign state is the source of law and not the reverse.
The existence of the state is undoubted proof of its superiority over the validity of the legal
norm. The decision frees itself from all normative ties and becomes in the true sense
absolute...The sovereign produces and guarantees the situation in its totality. He has the

10

Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty 3 (Julian H. Franklin ed. and trans.) (1992).

11

Schmitt, Carl, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty 5 (George Schwab trans.) (1988).
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monopoly over this last decision. Therein resides the essence of the state’s sovereignty, which
must be juristically defined correctly, not as a monopoly to coerce or rule, but to decide.12
The line of cases that embody the Prince share the I.C.J.’s acceptance of the sovereign state as
the source of political and legal authority. These cases embody the theme that the sovereign
state may at any point accept or reject the legal authority of an international court.
Sovereignty is the source of international law and law has power to bind the state only so long
as the state consents to be bound. Sovereignty, in this conceptualization, is the ultimate power
to decide from which all other power is derived.
1. LEGALITY OF THE USE BY A STATE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ARMED CONFLICT
In 1996, the World Health Organization (“WHO”) asked the Court to give an advisory opinion on
the question “would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a
breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO Constitution?”13 Over 30
states submitted written statements.14 Another nine submitted written comments to those
statements.15 The Court made it clear that its role is to “identify the obligations of States under
the rule of law invoked, and assess whether the behaviour in question conforms to those
obligations.”16
The Court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to provide an advisory opinion because
the WHO did not have competence to ask the question. The Court explained that international
organizations are created by states and are limited to serving the functions for which they were
created.17 International organizations may only ask the Court for advisory opinions on subjects
within the realm for which states had established them. The Court concluded that the WHO did
not have the competence to address the legality of the use of nuclear weapons, even in view of
the health effects of their use.18
12

Id. at 12‐13.

13

Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996, I.C.J. 68 (July 8).

14

Australia, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Finland, France, Germany,
India, Ireland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Nauru, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa,
Saudi Arabia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and United States of America submitted written statements.
15

Costa Rica, France, India, Malaysia, Nauru, Russian Federation, Solomon Islands, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and United States of America submitted written comments on their written statements.
16

Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996, I.C.J. 73 (July 8).

17

Id. at 78.

18

Id. at 79.
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The Court’s rejection of international organizations having unlimited powers to request legal
opinion supports the ideal type of the Prince. Only sovereign states have powers to address all
international legal issues.

2. LEGALITY OF THE USE BY A STATE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ARMED CONFLICT
The Court addressed the issue of nuclear weapons again in 1996 when the United Nations
General Assembly (“General Assembly”) passed resolution 49/75 asking the Court: “Is the
threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?”19
Nearly 30 states filed written statements.20 The Court concluded that it had both competence
and jurisdiction21 and rejected the appeal by the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Finland, Netherlands and Germany to use its discretionary power to decline rendering an
opinion.22 The Court held unambiguously that it “may give an advisory opinion on any legal
question, abstract or otherwise.”23
The Court rejected the General Assembly’s use of the word “permitted.” The Court explained
that international law is based on the principles of sovereignty and consent, and therefore,
states “are free to threaten or use nuclear weapons unless it can be shown that they are bound
not to do so by reference to a prohibition in either treaty law or customary law.”24
The Court then addressed the conventional sources of law supporting the illegality of the use of
nuclear weapons, including: (1) the right to life guaranteed in Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,25 (2) Article II of the Convention of 9 December 1948 on
19

Id. at 6.

20

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France,
Germany, India, Ireland, Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Lesotho, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Nauru,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Qatar, Russian Federation, Samoa, San Marino, Solomon Islands, Sweden, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America filed written statements. Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1996, p. 10 ¶ 5.
21

Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996, I.C.J. 18 (July 8).

22

Id. at 24. See also United States of America, Written Statement, pp. 1‐2; United Kingdom, Written Statement,
pp. 9‐20, ¶¶ 2.23‐ 2.45; France, Written Statement, pp. 13‐20, ¶¶ 5‐9; Finland, Written Statement, pp. 1‐2;
Netherlands, Written Statement, p. 3, ¶¶ 6‐13; Germany, Written Statement, pp. 3‐6, ¶ 2 (b).
23

Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996, I.C.J. 24 (July 8).

24

Id. at 28.

25

Id. at 30.
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the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,26 (3) norms relating to protecting the
environment, as stated in the Article 35 of the Additional Protocol 1 of 1977 to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (prohibiting “methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be
expected, to cause widespread, long‐term and severe damage to the natural environment”)
and the Convention of 18 May 1977 on the Prohibition of Military and Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques (prohibiting the use of weapons which have
“widespread, long‐lasting and severe effects” on the environment);27 as well as the
conventional treaties opposed to the general use of force, including (4) the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)28 and (5) a number of Environmental treaties.29
First, the Court dismissed: the ICCPR guarantee of a general “right to life” as prohibiting states
from using nuclear weapons. The Court reasoned that while the guarantee in the ICCPR does
not cease to have effect during times of war, the illegality of conflict is determined by the laws
of armed conflict and not by the terms o the ICCPR.
[W]hether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be
considered arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant [ICCPR], can only
be decided by reference to the aw applicable to armed conflict and not deduced from the terms
of the Covenant itself.30
In other words, loss of life is not contrary to Article 6 of the ICCPR unless the loss of life is the
consequence of an act that contravened the terms of the applicable law of armed conflict. The
Court applied the same logic to all conventional law and customary law guaranteeing life.
Second, the Court rejected environmental treaties as a source of conventional law prohibiting
states from using nuclear weapons. Some environmental treaties explicitly address
environmental protection during armed conflict (for example, General Assembly Resolution
47/37 of 25 November 1992 affirms that environmental consideration is an element to be taken
into account when implementing the principles of law governing armed conflict, stating
“destruction of the environment, not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly, is
clearly contrary to existing international law”),31 but because not all states have become parties
to certain environmental treaties, these treaties do not generally prohibit states from using
nuclear weapons during armed conflict.
26

Id. at 32.

27

Id. at 34.

28

Id. at 30.

29

Id. at 34.

30

Id. at 32.

31

Id. at 34‐5.
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Third, the Court rejected the argument that the United Nations Charter (the “Charter”)
prohibited the use of nuclear weapons.32 The Court held that states have the right to self‐
defense and reprisal—even with nuclear weapons—as long as that self‐defense and reprisal
conform to the proportionality rule (that is, that the response to an attack is proportionate to
the attack itself).33
Finally, the Court dismissed customary law as prohibiting states from using nuclear weapons,
despite a General Assembly resolution proclaiming their illegality.
…the first of the resolutions of the General Assembly expressly proclaiming the illegality of the
use of nuclear weapons, resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 (mentioned in subsequent
resolutions), after referring to certain international declarations and binding agreements, from
the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, proceeded to qualify
the legal nature of nuclear weapons, determine their effects, and apply general rules of
customary international law to nuclear weapons in particular. That application by the General
Assembly of general rules of customary law to the particular case of nuclear weapons indicates
that, in its [the Court’s] view, there was no specific rule of customary law which prohibited the
use of nuclear weapons; if such a rule had existed, the General Assembly could simply have
referred to it and would not have needed to undertake such an exercise of legal qualification.34
The Court held that given the current state of international law, the Court could not conclude
definitively whether the use of nuclear weapons by a state is legal in “an extreme circumstance
of self‐defence in which the state’s very survival would be at stake.”35 However, the Court
emphasized that there are certain fundamental rules of humanitarian law the must be observed
by all states—regardless of whether the states have ratified the conventions that contain
them—because they constitute “intransgressible principles of international customary law.”36
Despite a general consensus among states that humanitarian law, as part of jus cogens, applies
to the use of nuclear weapons, there was no consensus among states about whether this
application prohibited the use of nuclear weapons.37
The Court’s analysis in this case an acceptance that the state can use whatever means
necessary to defend itself. However, there are two sources of tension between the Prince and
32

Id. at 38.

33

Id. at 43‐4.

34

Id. at 33.

35

Id. at 41.

36

Id. at 35.

37

Id. at 39‐40.
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the Citizen in this case. First, although the Court accepted the state’s right to do what is
necessary to defend itself, including using nuclear weapons, the Court held that states are still
bound by certain fundamental principles of humanitarian law even when those states have not
ratified international humanitarian conventions or conventions directly addressing the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons.38 Second, despite the requests by a number of powerful
states for the Court to use its discretionary power to decline the case, the Court chose to
provide an advisory opinion. By providing this opinion, the Court has supported the Citizen
version of sovereignty insofar as the Court’s action supports the cause of international legal
proceduralism. In other words, even though the strict holding is that the current state of
international law does not generally prohibit the use of nuclear weapons by states, the fact that
there is a holding suggests that even questions that go to the heart of sovereignty are subject
to international law.
3. FISHERIES JURISDICTION CASE (SPAIN V. CANADA)
In 1998, the Court rendered its decision in the fishing dispute between Spain and Canada arising
out of an amendment to the Canadian Coastal Fisheries Protection Act. Spain requested the
Court to declare, among other things, that Canada’s legislation claiming jurisdiction over ships
flying foreign flags on the high seas was contrary to international law and that Canada must
refrain from repeating the incident when it boarded the Spanish ship Estai and brought the ship
and its crew to Newfoundland.39 Canada claimed that the I.C.J. did not have jurisdiction to hear
the case.40
In May 1994, Canada passed legislation (Parliament Bill C‐29 amending the Coastal Fisheries
Protection Act) extending protection of an area known as the Regulatory Area of the Northwest
Atlantic Organization (“NAFO”). The bill authorized certain Canadian “protection officers” to
ensure compliance with the new legislation by boarding and inspecting any vessel within the
NAFO area and, with a warrant, search any fishing vessel and arrest the person commanding
the vessel, among other things.41

38

See, e.g., Treaty of Tiatelolco of 14 February 1967 for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the
Treaty of Rarotonga of 6 August 1985 establishing a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the Antarctic Treaty of 1959,
prohibiting the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Antarctic or the 1963 Partial Test‐Ban Treaty or the Treaty
on the Non‐Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, limiting the use of nuclear weapons.
39

Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, (Spain v. Can.), 1998 9 (Dec. 4).

40

Id. at 7.

41

Id. at 11‐12.
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Two days before Canada passed the new legislation, Canada deposited with the UN Secretary‐
General a declaration giving notice that Canada was terminating its acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction of the I.C.J. in, among other areas, disputes concerning the conservation and
management of fishing vessels in the NAFO area.42
The Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the case because Canada’s actions fell
within the limits of its declaration concerning compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J., despite
Spain’s arguments that Canada’s actions were illegal under customary international law and
infringed on the sovereignty of a European member state.43 The Court held:
It is for each State, in formulating its declaration, to decide upon the limits it places upon its
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court: “This jurisdiction only exists within the limits within
which it has been accepted.” … A declaration of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court, whether there are specified limits set to that acceptance or not, is a unilateral act of
State sovereignty.44
The Court’s opinion in this case supports a core value of the Prince that international law exists
only with the agreement of individual sovereign states. The Court made it clear that Canada’s
declaration terminating compulsory I.C.J. jurisdiction for disputes concerning the conservation
and management of fishing in certain areas was Canada’s sovereign right.45

B. THE PROTECTOR
The office of sovereign, be it monarch or an assembly, consisteth in the end for which he was
trusted with the sovereign power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people, ... But by
safety here is not meant a bare preservation, but also all other contentments of life, which
every man by lawful industry, without danger or hurt to the Commonwealth, shall acquire to
himself.46
The Protector justifies its authority on its ability to protect its own citizens and environment.
Unlike the Prince, in which the state does not justify its supreme power but simply claims it
because the state is, the Protector takes certain actions (or does not take certain actions) based
on protecting its people and environment.
42

Id. at 10‐11.

43

Id. at 24.

44

Id. at 24‐25.

45

Canada gave notice that it was terminating its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction before it changed its
internal laws governing fishing in the NAFO area. In other words, Canada exercised its sovereign rights pursuant to
international legal procedures.
46

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 153 (Encyclopedia Brittanica ed.) (1992).
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The Protector shares many features with the Prince: both place the sovereign state above the
global community of states and both put the sovereign states above international law, but the
Protector is endowed with special rights only because it fulfills certain responsibilities. Hobbes
creates a blueprint of this ideal type in Leviathan; or the Matter, Forme and Power of the
Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil, which sets out a contract between the people and the
state whereby the people grant sovereignty to the state in return for the state fulfilling certain
obligations to the citizens.
This line of cases is based on the common theme that sovereignty allows the state to breach
international legal obligations because the state is the sole entity with the power to protect its
citizens. This conceptualization is a powerful argument for sovereignty because it appeals to
the basic human desire to protect one’s self from harm, but in the most recent cases discussed
below, the Court has rejected protection as a legitimate reason to justify a state breaching
international obligations. There is tension between this line of cases and the Prince line of
cases because, one the one hand, the Court accepts that sovereignty endows states with the
power to wage nuclear war to defend itself and the right to reject the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. in
order to protect and manage the environment for fishing, but on the other hand, the Court
rejects a state’s right to build a wall to protect its citizens from an acknowledged terrorist
threat and denies another state’s right to reject a Soviet‐era contract in order to protect the
environment. There is no simple way to explain the discrepancy between the two lines of
cases. The apparent logical inconsistency is not likely to be resolved by the I.C.J. or by
prevailing norms of state behavior. Rather, I think, the tension between the logic in the Prince
and the Protector underscores the importance of developing a functioning vocabulary to
describe competing conceptualizations of sovereignty.
1. LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF A WALL IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN
TERRITORY
In 2004, the Court rendered its advisory opinion on the General Assembly question concerning
the legal consequences of Israel constructing a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory
(including around East Jerusalem)?47 Over 45 parties submitted written statements.48 The
General Assembly based its request for an advisory opinion largely on resolution ES‐10113,
47
48

Construction of Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 9 (July 9).

Guinea, Saudi Arabia, League of Arab States, Egypt, Cameroon, Russian Federation, Australia, Palestine, United
Nations, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Canada, Syria, Switzerland, Israel, Yemen, United States: of America, Morocco,
Indonesia, Organization of the Islamic Conference, France, Italy, Sudan, South Africa, Germany, Japan, Norway,
United Kingdom, Pakistan, Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland on its own behalf, lreland on behalf of the European
Union, Cyprus, Brazil, Namibia, Malta, Malaysia, Netherlands, Cuba, Sweden, Spain, Belgium, Palau, Federated
States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Senegal, Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Construction of Wall,
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 2004, p. 10 ¶ 9.
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adopted by the General Assembly on 27 October 2003, which demanded Israel stop and reverse
the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.49
Israel argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction because the General Assembly acted ultra
vires under the Charter when it requested an advisory opinion because Security Council was
then actively involved in the Middle East.50 The Court, however, rejected Israel’s arguments
because, among other things, the General Assembly has the authority to act when the Security
Council has both (1) failed to exercise its responsibility for maintaining international peace as
the result of negative votes of one or more permanent members and (2) there appears to be a
threat to the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.51 In the Court’s view, the
construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory met that requirement.
First, the Court stated that the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory were in
breach of international law.52 Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention people living in the Occupied Territory “shall not be deprived, in an case or in any
manner whatsoever, of the benefits” of the Fourth Geneva Convention.53 By constructing a
wall, the Court held that Israel was in breach of several treaty obligations because the wall had
destroyed certain agricultural lands and in certain areas, (such as the Qalqilya enclave) citizens
were restricted in the times they can enter and exit the area.54
Second, the Court rejected Israel’s argument that the construction of the wall was justified by
Israel’s right to self‐defense, as laid out in Article 51 of the Charter.55 Article 51 recognizes the
inherent right of self‐defense in the case of an armed attack by one state against another state.
The Court held that no such armed attack existed or was claimed to exist in the Occupied
Territory. Furthermore, Israel did not claim that the attacks against its citizens were imputable
to a foreign state. The Court also pointed out that Israel exercises control over the Occupied
Palestinian Territory and so it cannot also claim the right to self‐defense.56 The Court accepted
that Israel faces many indiscriminate and deadly acts of violence against its civilian population
and that Israel has the right and the duty to respond and protect the life of its citizens, but
49

Construction of Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 15 (July 9).

50

Id.

51

Id. at 18‐19.

52

Id. at 52.

53

Id. at 53‐54.

54

Id. at 57‐58.

55

Id. at 62.

56

Id.
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stated that any measures Israel takes to protect its citizens must conform with applicable
international law.57 The Court found that Israel’s construction of a wall was contrary to
applicable international law.58
This case sets the bar extremely high for the Protector. Although the Court made reference to
the importance that a state protect its citizens, the standard a state must meet in order to
comply with international norms and conventions in this case were too high for Israel to
demonstrate that building a wall in the Occupied Territory comported with those norms.

2. CASE CONCERNING THE GABCÍKOVO‐NAGYMAROS PROJECT (HUNGARY/SLOVAKIA)
The question before the Court in this 1997 decision was whether Hungary was entitled to
suspend (and later abandon) the work on the Nagymoros Project and part of the Gabcíkovo
project, which combined were part of a large barrage project on the river Danube initiated by
the Budapest Treaty of 1977 between Czechoslovakia and Hungary to prevent catastrophic
floods, to improve sailing quality and to produce clear electricity. Hungary argued that the
suspension was justified by a “state of ecological necessity.”59 Slovakia, in response, argued
that the state of necessity Hungary relied upon “did not constitute a reason for the suspension
of a treaty obligation recognized by the law of treaties.”60
The disagreement between the two states was straightforward and the Court simply applied
the standards necessary for showing a state of necessity as defined by Article 33 of the
International Law Commission. In order to meet that standard, Hungary must demonstrate
that (1) there was an essential interest of the state which conflicts with its international
obligations, (2) the relevant interest was threatened by “grave and imminent peril” and (3) the
act being questioned was the “only means” the state had of safeguarding the essential state
interest.61
Although the Court acknowledged that safeguarding ecological interests was an essential
interest of all states, the danger posed by the barrage of the Danube was not imminent in 1989
when Hungary suspended its work on the project.62
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This case is significant in terms of defining the Protector because the Court directly addresses
weighing environmental damage and complying with treaty obligations. What is intriguing in
this decision is that the Court suggests that environmental concerns transcend state borders,
which could make it a very difficult precedent in the future for states who want to claim a state
of necessity on the basis of ecological concerns. It seems that the Court may be indicating that
because environmental damage does not respect state borders, one state alone cannot claim a
state of necessity.

C. THE CITIZEN
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain
common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive of
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share
in the workings of common institutions.63
At the core of the Citizen is the idea that the state is bound by the norms and rules of a larger
community of states and people within the state’s own borders. The state as Citizen is
antithetical to both an anarchical and hierarchical international structure. That is to say,
sovereignty that relies on citizenship in a society of states does not allow for any state—even
the most powerful—to reject international norms. States are bound by norms of the larger
international community of fellow states as well as obligations to citizens living within states’
own borders. Sovereignty, that is the ultimate power to decide, does not reside in the state
government structure, but rather is dispersed in the people as a whole (and their collective
right to elect their officials and, in the extreme, to revolt) and the community of states who
collectively recognize a state as a member of the international community (and hence a
“sovereign state”) or not depending on whether a state complies generally with the norms and
responsibilities generally agreed upon by the international community of sovereign states.
Deudney describes such a political structure as “negarchy” because the structure is defined by
what it negates rather than what it allows. In other words, a negarchy is a system that prevents
certain actions by binding actors.
Negarchy is the arrangement of institutions needed to prevent simultaneously the emergence
of hierarchy and anarchy. In a workable negarchy, the particular configurations of negatives
vary with the relative strengths of multiple threats, but the antithesis to hierarchy and anarchy
remains constant. Understood this way, negarchy is a third—and liberal—structural principle of
political order, along with hierarchy and anarchy.64
63

Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society 13 (1977).

64

Daniel Deudney, State Sovereignty as Social Construct 205 (Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber eds.) (1996).

14

CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 06 NO. 02

Deudney argues that the early American history (between the establishment of the Union
beginning in 1781 and the American Civil Was ending in 1865) provides a robust example of
such a negarchical system.65 The Philadelphian system, with its “American emphasis on laws
and procedures to resolve conflicts and allocate goods,” relied on the practice of legal
procedures to moderate anarchical dynamics.66 Even in cases of territorial disputes, an area of
“hard politics” notorious for upsetting even the most liberal structures, Deudney argues that
during the negarchical period of American history, legal proceduralism took precedence of
violence as a method for resolving conflicts. One case he describes concerned a conflict over
territory in northeastern Pennsylvania between Connecticut and Pennsylvania resulting from
overlapping charter grants. Although there had been some violent skirmishes between the two
states, both Pennsylvania and Connecticut accepted an ad hoc legal arbitration set up in New
Jersey.
Since the 1990’s, the majority of the cases the Court has decided underscore the developing
importance of states binding themselves in a nascent negarchical structure. The cases in this
line is varied but they share two central themes (1) the court asserts its legal authority in
defining state responsibilities and (2) sovereign states accept legal procedures as a means of
resolving conflicts. Furthermore, in this conceptualization of sovereignty there are no
absolutes, but rather there is a sliding scale of “more or less” sovereign. Sovereign states bind
themselves so as to avoid the potential violent consequences of unbridled power. Sovereignty
is the ultimate power to decide, but the scope of decisions that can be made is limited. The
Court’s reasoning in the Nuclear Weapons cases—cases that on one level strongly support the
sovereignty as Prince—illustrates this scope limitation. There is nothing in current international
law to preclude a sovereign state from using nuclear weapons in proportionate self‐defense,
but the sovereign state is bound to not use nuclear weapons offensively or as a
disproportionate response to an attack. Of course, the skeptic may argue that there really is no
Citizen conceptualization because if a state wanted to use nuclear weapons offensively, there is
nothing that could prevent that state from doing so. To that argument, I can only respond that
the same can be said about any state that prohibits its citizens from murdering each other. If
one citizen wants to murder another, he or she most certainly can and the state can do nothing
to prevent the murder. The mere fact that murder happens, does not mean that there is no
law against citizens killing each other. I would argue that the reasoning applies to the line of
cases that make up the Citizen. The fact that states can and do act in ways contrary to the
general norms does not demonstrate that sovereign states have not bound themselves, any
more so than the fact that citizens occasionally kill each other demonstrates that there is no
agreed‐upon prohibition of murder. The Citizen is not meant to predict the future of state
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interaction or describe all of sovereignty, but rather it is an addition to a working vocabulary of
state sovereignty.

1. CASE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA V. SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)
In 2007, the Court rendered its decision in the Case Concerning the Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Bosnia and
Herzegovina requested the Court to adjudge and declare, among other things, that the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (the “FRY”) had violated the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the “Genocide Convention”) by destroying and
attempting to destroy in whole national, ethnical or religious groups within the territory of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular the Muslim population.67 The FRY contended that the
acts alleged were not committed.68
First, the Court confirmed that it did have jurisdiction based on Article XI of the Genocide
Convention.69 Then the Court addressed the problem of the duality of its responsibility that
international law is concerned with the actions of sovereign states and does not punish
individuals. The Court re‐stated the famous phrase from the Nuremberg Judgment that
“[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract entities…”70
Second, the Court affirmed that both Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro are
bound by their obligation under the Genocide Convention not to commit “through their organs
or persons who conduct is attributable to them” genocide or any of the other acts proscribed
by the Genocide Convention.71
Third, the Court concluded that there had been massive killings in detention camps and other
areas throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and those massacres constituted genocide.72
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Having established that genocide had been committed, the Court then addressed the question
of whether the Respondent State of Serbia and Montenegro could be held responsible. The
Court had to decide whether genocide and the other acts could be attributed to the
Respondent by ascertaining whether any person or organ whose acts can be attributed to the
Respondent committed the relevant acts.73
Under international law, a state is responsible for any act committed by its state organ.74 A
state can also be held responsible for the conduct or persons, or groups of persons, who do not
have the legal status of state organs if they are under the “strict control” of the state in
question.75 The standard for determining “strict control” requires the Court to find that such
persons or groups are “wholly dependent” on the state.76 Being “wholly dependent” requires a
finding that the state gave specific instructions—and not merely general instructions—to those
carrying out the violations.77
Applying these standards to the evidence of massacres at Srebrenica, the Court found that it
was not established that FRY was responsible for the actions of those who committed the
massacres.78 However, the Court concluded that FRY violated its obligation to prevent the
Srebrenica genocide and had failed to punish those responsible.79
This decision underscores the idea of the state as a Citizen of a society of states because the
Court applied a clear standard of behavior and applied those standards to a concrete case. The
decision demonstrates that international norms require states to comply with international
laws within their own borders. States must comply with humanitarian law even within its own
borders. While the standard the Court applied to determine state attribution has left some
observers frustrated, that standard does not alter the underlying political and legal decision
that states are bound by humanitarian law in dealing with their own citizens, even in times of
conflict.
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2. LAGRAND CASE (GERMANY V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
This 2001 case concerns two German nationals who had been put to death in Arizona after
having been found guilty of murder. The German nationals were brothers, Karl and Walter
Bernhard LaGrand, who had been found guilty of killing a man and severely injuring a woman
during the course of robbing a bank in Arizona. The brothers had been born in Germany, but
although they had lived in the United States since they were very young, they had never
acquired United States citizenship. As foreign nationals, they were consequently entitled to
contact their consulate under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (the
“Vienna Convention”).
Germany asked the Court to declare, among other things, that (1) the United States violated
the Vienna Convention by not notifying the German consulate of the LaGrand brothers’ arrest,
(2) certain U.S. legal rules make it impossible for foreign states to raise lack of consular
notification under U.S. law and (3) the United States violated its international legal obligations
by failing to take all possible measure to ensure that the LaGrand brothers were not executed
pending a final decision in the I.C.J. case concerning the brothers. The United States apologized
to Germany for not notifying Germany and instituted certain precautionary measures to
prevent a similar recurrence, but asked the Court otherwise to dismiss Germany’s claims.80
The case arose in the first place because there was some confusion over the nationality of the
LaGrand brothers from the time they were arrested.81 Apparently, the brothers had been
adopted by an American and “had the demeanor and speech of Americans rather than
Germans.”82 The United States argued that not only did the brothers not identify themselves as
Germans, but also that the brothers themselves were unaware that they were not U.S.
nationals.83 The brothers’ court appointed counsel did not raise non‐compliance with the
Vienna Convention in the defense and did not contact the German consular authorities.84 Even
during the lengthy period of appeals after conviction, no one notified German consular
authorities and the brothers’ attorneys did not raise the issue of failing to notify German
consular authorities as required by the Vienna Convention.85 It was not until the brothers’
counsel had filed writs of habeas corpus that the Vienna Convention issue of consular
80
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notification was raised. The United States District Court for the District of Arizona rejected the
issue of consular notification on the basis of the “procedural default rule” which provides that
issues cannot be raised in federal courts of appeal unless they have first been raised in state
courts.86
On 21 December 1998, U.S. authorities formally notified the LaGrand brothers of their right to
consular access. On 15 January 1999, the Arizona Supreme Court decided that Karl LaGrand
would be executed on 24 February 1999 and Walter LaGrand would be executed on 3 March
1999. Germany claimed to have learned of the execution dates on 19 January 1999.87
On 19 January 1999, Germany launched proceedings in the United States Supreme Court
against both the United States and the Governor of Arizona seeking, among other things, to
enforce compliance of an I.C.J. Order requiring provisional measures postponing the brothers’
executions pending a final decision in the I.C.J. case. The United States Solicitor General argued
that an I.C.J. order requiring provisional measures is not binding and does not provide a basis
for relief.88 The U.S. Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction with respect to Germany's
complaint against Arizona due to the eleventh amendment of the U.S. constitution, which
prohibits federal courts from hearing lawsuits of foreign states against a U.S. state. Regarding
Germany’s claim against the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held the doctrine of
procedural default was not incompatible with the Vienna Convention and that even if
procedural default did conflict with the Vienna Convention it had been overruled by later
federal law—the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which explicitly
legislated the doctrine of procedural default.
The United States Department of State conveyed the I.C.J.’s order to the Governor of Arizona
without comment. The Arizona clemency board recommended a stay of execution to the
governor on the basis of the I.C.J. provisional measure. The governor of Arizona ignored the
recommendation and both brothers were executed.
The I.C.J. held in Germany’s favor that (1) the United States had violated its obligations under
paragraph 1(b) of the Vienna Convention when it failed to inform Germany’s consular
authorities that it had detained German nationals;89 (2) the procedural default rule effectively
prevented Germany from challenging the LaGrands’ convictions and sentences under United
States constitutional grounds, which prevented “full effect [from being] given to the purposes
86
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for which the rights accorded under this article [Article 36 of the Vienna Convention] are
intended,”90 and (3) the I.C.J.’s power to indicate provisional measures is binding.91
While the Court’s decision favored Germany, the Court noted that the United States had (1)
acknowledged that it had not complied with its obligation to give consular notification, (2)
apologized to Germany, and (3) the United States had provided the Court with information on a
program it was carrying out to ensure that both state and federal authorities comply with the
United States’ obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention.92
This case is significant not only because it demonstrates the necessity that states comply with
international norms (and the United States took efforts to prevent a future breach), but also
because this case stands for the proposition that a state’s internal laws must comply with its
external obligations. The Court held that the procedural default prevented the United States
from complying with its obligations under the Vienna Convention. In other words, this case
demonstrates states binding themselves in their internal and external actions.

3. CASE CONCERNING ARMED ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF THE CONGO (DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO V. UGANDA)
This 2005 case concerns whether Uganda violated its obligations under customary and
international law, including (1) the non‐use of force and the prohibition of aggression, (2) the
obligation to settle international disputes peacefully, (3) to respect sovereignty and the right of
people to self‐determination and (4) the principle of non‐intervention.93 The Court
acknowledged the “tragic situation which has long prevailed in the Great Lakes region” and
noted that the local population had long suffered because of factional conflictions between
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) and armed groups from neighboring states (i.e., The
Republic of Uganda).94
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Uganda argued that the DRC consented to the actions of its troops in the DRC until 11
September 1998 and that after that date Uganda was acting in self‐defense.95 In general,
Uganda did not argue that the events the DRC alleged did not occur, but rather that the
Uganda’s military action was legal.
The Court found otherwise. The Court held that Uganda had violated international law and was
obligated to make reparations to the DRC. The Court’s holding is clear: armed conflict does not
excuse states from complying with international humanitarian law. This case stands for the
proposition that states must comply with international customs and treaties, even in times of
armed conflict and supports the line of cases establishing a basis of states as citizens who are
bound by certain norms in international relations.

4. CASE CONCERNING TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME DISPUTE BETWEEN NICARAGUA AND
HONDURAS IN THE CARIBBEAN SEA (NICARAGUA V. HONDURAS)
This 2007 case dates back to a colonial dispute in the early 1800s. Both Nicaragua and
Honduras had been Spanish colonies and became independent in 1821. At that time Nicaragua
and Honduras—along with Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica—formed the Federal
Republic of Central America. In 1838, both Nicaragua and Honduras seceded from the
Federation, maintaining the territory they had before they had joined the Federation. In 1850,
the Republic of Nicaragua and Spain signed a treaty in which Spain recognized Nicaragua as
“free, sovereign and independent” with “all its territories that now belong to it from sea to sea,
or that will later belong to it.”96 In 1866, Honduras and Spain signed a similar treaty in which
Spain recognized Honduras as a “free, sovereign and independent state, which comprises the
entire territory that was the province of that name during the period of Spanish domination,
this territory being bounded in the East, Southeast and South by the Republic of Nicaragua.”97
In 1869, Nicaragua and Honduras attempted to delineate their boundary by signing the Ferrer‐
Medina Treaty and the Ferrer‐Uriarte Treaty in 1870, but neither treaty entered into force.98 In
1894, Nicaragua and Honduras successfully concluded the Gámez‐Bonilla Treaty, which stated
that according to the principle of uti possidetis juris, each state “is the owner of the territory
which at the date of independence constituted respectively, the provinces of Honduras and
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Nicaragua.”99 The treaty also set out a commission whose duty it was to settle all pending
boundary differences in a “friendly manner.” The committee met for four years but was unable
to determine all boundaries. Pursuant to Article III of the Gámez‐Bonilla Treaty, Nicaragua and
Honduras submitted their dispute over the remaining boundaries to the King of Spain, as sole
arbitrator. King Alfonso XIII of Spain made his decision in 1906.100 Nicaragua then challenged
the validity of the king’s arbitral award and, after several failed attempts to settle the dispute
(including an ad hoc committee of the Organization of American States who addressed the
issue), Nicaragua and Honduras agreed to submit the dispute to the I.C.J.101
The Court’s analysis of the boundary dispute began first with the principle that maritime rights
are determined by the coastal state’s sovereignty over the land, which means sovereignty over
certain islands would determine the maritime boundary.102 In order to determine which state
had sovereignty over the disputed islands, the court invoked uti possidetis juris, the Court must
consider which colony Spain had intended to have control over the islands in question and
which colony actually had effective control.103
[A] claim to sovereignty based upon some particular act or title such as a treaty of cession but
merely upon a continued display of authority, involves two elements each of which must be
shown to exist: the intention and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of
such authority.104
Because the islands in question are uninhabited (or not permanently inhabited), the Court
found it difficult to determine effective control, and so turned to the question of whether there
was a pattern of displaying sovereign authority, even if those displays were modest.105 The
Court reviewed a number of issue areas to determine displays of sovereignty, including
whether a state (1) applied and enforced criminal and civil law,106 (2) regulated immigration,107
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(3) regulated fishing activities,108 (4) performed naval patrols,109 and (5) performed public
works.110
Having reviewed all the evidence, the Court concluded that Honduras had sovereignty over the
islands in question based on its overall pattern of conduct after independence from Spain.111
The Court’s decision in this case supports the Citizen line of cases on two levels for analysis:
first, as an example of sovereign states binding themselves to legal procedures and second, as a
source of a list of what the international community accepts as markers of sovereignty.
By jointly submitting this case to the I.C.J., Nicaragua and Honduras demonstrated the strength
of legal proceduralism as a norm in international relations today. This case is strikingly similar
to the example of negarchy Deudney described in which Pennsylvania and Connecticut
submitted a territorial dispute stemming from competing colonial charters to an arbitral
tribunal in Delaware, Honduras and Nicaragua jointly submitted this case stemming from
unclear colonial treaties to the I.C.J. In both cases, armed conflict was rejected in favor of legal
procedures as a method of settling territorial disputes.
Second, the Court provided a list of factors indicating what constitutes sovereignty over certain
territory. This list shows a connection between norms in the international community of states
and the internal organization of a state. In order to successfully claim sovereignty over a
region, a state must demonstrate that it is conforming to internationally‐agreed upon norms.
CONCLUSION
There is a lot of work to be done to create a working vocabulary of state sovereignty. By
analyzing international legal discourse at the I.C.J., it will be possible to understand how the
Court (and states themselves) uses the term sovereignty. A taxonomy of sovereignty may be a
worthwhile enterprise on its own, but I would like it to be a starting point for addressing other
questions concerning sovereignty, including:
•
Is there a connection between the arguments concerning state sovereignty and
the larger international political context? (In other words, during the post‐war period of bi‐
polar political structure, was sovereignty discussed differently than during the brief period of
American hegemony or during the current fluid multi‐polar political period?)
•
Is there a relationship between the state type and the way a state discusses
sovereignty? (Stated differently, do dominant states tend to present sovereignty in similar ways
108
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despite ideological differences? Do smaller, less dominant states share similarities in their
views of sovereignty?)
•
How closely does the international legal discussion concerning state sovereignty
track the Westphalian “ideal type” of the sovereign state?
While there is no clear end in sight for the tension between the Prince and the Citizen (or
between Schmitt and Kelsen) that Koskenniemi has so eloquently describes in his work, I hope
that this paper serves as a starting point for creating a working vocabulary of state sovereignty
and opens the conversation between international law and international relations about what it
means to be a sovereign state.

